Energy & Natural Resources
State-led efforts in the upstream sector of the petroleum economy in Ghana: the proposed acquisition of Springfield’s interest

Introduction
Any account of African countries endowed with natural resources would be incomplete without reference to the Republic of Ghana,. As its former name, Gold Coast, suggests, this country is richly endowed with natural resources, notably, gold and crude oil - often referred to as ‘black gold’.
Ghana’s economy for centuries rested predominantly on gold and cocoa. This economic trajectory began to shift significantly in 2007 following the discovery of commercially viable oil reserves by Kosmos Energy. The discovery, located about 60 kilometers (37 miles) off the western coast of Ghana, straddling the Deepwater Tano and West Cape Three Points Block 2 (WCTP2), positioned the country as a commercial oil and gas producer within the global market.
Unsurprisingly, this discovery was met with widespread excitement and national pride, particularly as it coincided with Ghana’s 50th independence anniversary, hence the name, Jubilee Field. Public expectations were high, with many believing that oil production would accelerate infrastructure development and enhance national prosperity.
Indeed, then-President John Agyekum Kufuor described the discovery as one with the potential to transform Ghana into an “African tiger in economic terms for development.”
Notwithstanding the optimism, cautionary voices were equally prominent. Concerns were raised that Ghana’s experience might mirror that of other resource-rich countries associated with the so-called “resource curse”. These concerns underscored a central truth that the attainment of “African Tiger” status, does not flow automatically from the mere presence of natural resources but depends fundamentally on sound governance and prudent resource management.
Against this backdrop, this article examines Ghana’s efforts to develop and strengthen its upstream petroleum sector - particularly the Government of Ghana’s proposed acquisition of the interest of Springfield Exploration and Production (SEP) Limited in the West Cape Three Points 2 Block, and the implications of this proposal for state participation and sector governance.
Understanding The Petroleum Value Chain
The petroleum industry – commonly referred to as the oil and gas industry – encompasses the activities in the exploration, extraction, refining, storage, transportation and marketing of petroleum and petroleum-derived products. These products include, among others, diesel fuel and kerosene, which are obtained through the refining of crude oil.
The industry is conventionally divided into three main segments: upstream, midstream and downstream. The upstream sector relates to the exploration for and production of crude oil and natural gas. The midstream sector involves the storage, transportation and in some instances, the marketing of petroleum resources. The downstream sector constitutes the final stage of the value chain and focuses on refining crude oil into finished and usable petroleum products such as diesel fuel, kerosene for consumption.
In Ghana, key participants across these sectors include Springfield Group, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, Bulk Oil Storage and Transportation (BOST) Company Limited, Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) Limited, GOIL PLC, TotalEnergies Marketing Ghana PLC, as well as consumers of petroleum products, among others.
The Upstream Petroleum Sector
As earlier stated, the upstream sector relates to the exploration for and production of crude oil. Pursuant to section 23 of the Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 821), activities within this sector include exploration, development and production of petroleum; the acquisition of petroleum data; the drilling of wells; the treatment, storag and pipeline transportation of petroleum; decommissioning; and the planning, design, construction, installation, operation and use of facilities for the purpose of carrying out these activities.
Ghana’s petroleum exploration history predates independence, with early exploratory drilling undertaken along the coast and within the Tano Basin. During that period, early wells were drilled with limited geological knowledge and without the benefit of seismic data110.
The discovery of the Saltpond Oil Field in 1970 by the Signal/Amoco Group marked Ghana’s first commercial petroleum success. Production subsequently commenced in 1978, with Agri-Petco serving as the operator.111
The discovery of the Jubilee Field in 2007 represented a major turning point in Ghana’s petroleum sector and was followed by further commercial discoveries, including the Tweneboa-Enyenra-Ntomme (TEN) Fields, the Sankofa-Gye Nyame (SGN) Fields and the Afina-1X well. Currently, oil production is undertaken in the Jubilee, TEN and SGN Fields by international investors such as Tullow Oil and ENI, among others.112
Regulatory and Institutional Framework of the Upstream Petroleum Sector
The primary regulatory body of Ghana’s upstream petroleum sector is the Petroleum Commission (PC), established under section 1 of the Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 821). Its principal mandate is to regulate and manage the utilization of petroleum resources and to co-ordinate policies relating to the sector.113
Although Act 821 does not expressly confine the regulatory authority of the Petroleum Commission to upstream petroleum activities, a holistic reading of its provisions reveals that its mandate is predominantly upstream-focused. This conclusion is evident from the combined effect of sections 3 and 23 of the Act. While section 3 expands the objects of the Commission to include ensuring compliance with applicable laws and regulations governing petroleum activities, section 23 defines petroleum activities as those relating to the exploration for, development, and production of petroleum.114
Consequently, the Commission’s regulatory authority is largely circumscribed to the upstream petroleum sector.
Other institutions involved in the governance of the upstream petroleum sector include the Ministry of Energy and Green Transition (Ministry), Ghana National Petroleum Commission (GNPC) and Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC).
The Ministry of Energy and Green Transition is responsible for the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of energy policies, as well as the supervision and coordination of agencies within the energy sector.115 It therefore serves as the overarching authority over the energy sector institutions including the Petroleum Commission.
In this regard, the power to make regulations relating to upstream petroleum activities is vested in the Minister responsible for Energy, who exercises this authority on the advice of the Board of the Petroleum Commission.116 Additionally, the power to grant reconnaissance licence resides in the Minister, acting in consultation with the Petroleum Commission.117 This arrangement contrasts with the downstream sector, where the National Petroleum Authority, as the primary regulator, possesses independent authority to make regulations and issue operating licenses.118
The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) functions as the State’s commercial vehicle for participation in upstream petroleum operations. It is mandated to undertake the exploration, development, production and disposal of petroleum.119 To facilitate the attainment of its mandate, section 10 of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 (Act 919) requires every petroleum agreement to include a term granting the Corporation a minimum of fifteen percent (15%) carried interest in the petroleum operations.
The Public Interest and Accountability Committee is established under section 51 of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815). As an independent oversight body, PIAC is mandated to monitor and promote transparency and accountability in the management and utilization of petroleum revenues across spans across all segments of Ghana’s petroleum industry.120
Overview of Springfield Exploration and Production (SEP) Limited
A central objective of Ghana’s petroleum policy has bee the promotion of indigenous participation in the oil industry. To this end, the legal framework accords first preference to an indigenous Ghanaian Company (IGC) in the grant of petroleum licenses.121 In addition, apart from GNPC, the law requires that an IGC holds a minimum equity participation of five percent (5%) in petroleum operations.122
To support the participation of indigenous companies and Ghanaian citizens, the framework further provides for the establishment of a Local Content Fund.123 Notwithstanding these measures, indigenous participation – particularly in terms of local ownership of upstream operations – has remained limited.
It is within this context that Springfield Exploration and Production Limited (Company) occupies a distinctive position within Ghana’s upstream petroleum sector. The Company became the first wholly Ghanaian-owned entity to be awarded an upstream petroleum block with a majority participating interest when it was granted the West Cape Three Points Block 2 (WCTP2), in partnership with GNPC and GNPC Explorco.124
Given the capital-intensive and technically complex nature of the upstream petroleum operations, there was widespread skepticism regarding the Company’s capacity to secure and develop the block. Contrary to these expectations, the Company, in 2019, announced the discovery of commercial quantities of hydrocarbons in the Afina -1X well.125
The Company subsequently disclosed that appraisal of the Afina -1X well indicated a maximum flow rate of approximately 4,500 barrels of oil per day, suggesting favourable reservoir productivity.126 Based on these findings, it has been estimated that the WCTP2 Block could be valued at over US$3 billion if fully developed.127
Despite these technical successes, the development and production of the WCTP2 Block have been stalled, largely due to suspected financial constraints and the Company’s involvement in legal disputes. Paramount among these is the dispute arising from allegations of a loan indebtedness of approximately US$100 million owed by the Springfield Group to Petraco Oil Company. This dispute has reportedly resulted in a complaint lodged with the Economic and Organized Crime Office.128
State-Led Efforts To Strengthen The Upstream Petroleum Sector
The contribution of the oil and gas sector to Ghana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and by extension government revenue, has experienced a sustained decline in recent years. Upstream oil and gas activities contributed 3.72 per cent to GDP growth in 2017.129 This contribution subsequently declined, recording a negative growth rate of −0.39 per cent in 2020 and falling to −0.2 per cent in 2023.130
As at the end of December 2024, total crude oil production from Ghana's three producing fields stood at 48,240,030.04 barrels, representing a marginal decline of approximately 0.01 percent from the 48,247,036.61 barrels recorded in 2023.131
While the contraction recorded in 2020 has largely been attributed to the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, PIAC has indicated that the decline in 2023 resulted principally from reduced production in the Jubilee, TEN, and SGN Fields.132
Part of the observed decline may also be attributed to the broader structural developments within the global energy sector. The ongoing energy transition – characterized by a shift in capital allocation away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy sources - has introduced significant uncertainty into upstream oil and gas investment decisions.
In this regard, TotalEnergies’ decision in 2020 to discontinue the acquisition of Occidental petroleum’s assets in Ghana was justified on the basis of the need to “provide financial flexibility to face the uncertainties and opportunities linked to the current environment.”133 Projections further suggest that by 2035, oil production from Ghana’s three producing fields could decline by as much as eighty percent (80%). “All of the undiscovered oil in Ghana is at stake.”134
In response to these developments, the State has undertaken a range of initiatives aimed at revitalizing upstream petroleum activities, enhancing local participation and positioning indigenous Ghanaian companies to participate meaningfully in petroleum operations. These initiatives include the development of draft Guidelines for the Transfer of Technology, Skills, and Know-How as well as the implementation of the Accelerated Oil and Gas Capacity (AOGC) Programme, which aim to strengthen domestic technical capacity and reduce reliance on expatriate labour.135
Another notable intervention is the commencement of GNPC’s flagship onshore exploration project in the Volta Basin, which is intended to unlock Ghana’s untapped hydrocarbon potential136 and diversify the country’s petroleum portfolio.
In November 2025, the Government of Ghana announced its intention to acquire the interests of Springfield Exploration and Production Limited in the WCTP 2, through the GNPC and GNPC Explorco. This proposed acquisition is not without precedent. In July 2021, GNPC disclosed its intention to acquire a stake in Aker Energy’s interests in the Deep Water Tano/Cape Three Points (DWT/CTP) Block and the South Deep Water Tano (SDWT) Block.137 This transaction, however, did not materialize, and in 2023, Aker Energy was subsequently acquired by Africa Investment Block, a subsidiary of Africa Finance Corporation.138
In articulating the rationale for the proposed acquisition of the Company’s interests in WCTP2, the Ministry of Energy and Green Transition stated as follows:
“With Ghana’s national crude oil declining over the years, coupled with uncertainties within the global energy transition, government considers it urgent to advance the development of the WCTP 2 resource base. A timely intervention is essential to prevent further delays to field development, unlock the block’s long-term economic value, sustain upstream activity and associated national revenues, and enhance Ghana’s overall energy security.”139
This justification situates the proposed acquisition within a broader strategy of state intervention aimed at reversing declining production, mitigating investment uncertainty, and safeguarding national energy and revenue security.
The critical question that therefore arises is whether the State can realistically achieve these objectives through the proposed acquisition, or whether the initiative represents an ambitious but unattainable policy response.
Positive Implications of the State’s Proposal
The proposed acquisition of Springfield Exploration and Production Limited’s interest by the State has the potential to accelerate socio-economic development and advance Ghana’s long term development agenda. In particular, it may contribute towards the attainment of the objectives of Vision 2057, including improved living standards for Ghanaians and the achievement of upper middle-income country status.
Prospects for Increased Upstream Petroleum Production
A highly probable outcome of the State’s acquisition of the Company’s interest is an increase in upstream petroleum production. As earlier noted, Springfield held a majority interest in the WCTP 2 Block alongside GNPC and GNPC Explorco, both state-owned entities. The acquisition of Springfield’s interests by GNPC would therefore result in full state participation and control over petroleum operations in the block.
Enhanced state participation and control places the Government in a stronger position to address the constraints that have delayed the development and production of the Afina-1X discovery. For instance, the ongoing unitisation negotiations between ENI and Springfield, identified as a major source of delay are likely to be expedited through direct state involvement. In addition, improved access to capital through state-backed financing arrangements may facilitate the mobilization of resources necessary for to efficien field development.
With these bottlenecks addressed, production activities could commence and progress more rapidly, leading to increased petroleum output. In the context of the global transition towards renewable energy, accelerating petroleum production may be prudent, given the growing risk that undeveloped oil reserves could become economically redundant in the medium to long term.
While higher production may hasten resource depletion, this concern is mitigated by the existence of the Ghana Heritage Fund which is designed to benefit future generations once petroleum reserves have been depleted.140
Growth in Petroleum Revenue and Earnings
Another significant implication of the proposed acquisition of the Company’s interests is the potential increase in petroleum revenue and earnings. It is undisputed that petroleum remains a substantial contributor to Ghana’s gross domestic product and, by extension, government revenue. In 2023, petroleum production generated receipts of approximately US$1,062.32 million (GH¢12,370.01 million).141 Increased petroleum output therefore holds the potential to generate additional fiscal benefits.
Notwithstanding the risks associated with volatility in global oil prices, particularly in light of the energy transition, higher production levels are likely to translate into increased petroleum receipts. These revenues accrue from multiple sources, including profits retained within the domestic economy, royalties, carried and participating interests, corporate income tax paid by oil companies and their subcontractors, and other statutory petroleum revenues.
Broader Fiscal Benefits through Employment and Economic Multipliers
The proposed acquisition may also yield broader fiscal benefits by stimulating employment creation and skills development. Both direct and indirect employment opportunities within the petroleum value chain generate multiplier effects by increasing household incomes and purchasing power. This, in turn, enhances investment capacity, job creation, and overall economic activity.
Expanded economic activity broadens the government’s revenue base through personal income tax, value-added tax, and other fiscal instruments, ultimately resulting in increased public revenue.
Infrastructure Development
Higher public revenue would significantly strengthen the State’s fiscal capacity to initiate and sustain major developmental projects, particularly under the Ghana Infrastructure Plan (GIP) which was officially launched by President John Dramani Mahama on 22nd October 2025. The GIP provides a strategic framework for infrastructure development across critical sectors including energy, housing, water and information and communications technology, in order for the state to attain its long-term development goals.142
The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) has estimated that approximately US$1.1 trillion will be required between 2018 and 2047 to fully implement the the GIP.143 However, the NDPC has acknowledged that Ghana’s current revenue and expenditure levels are insufficient to support the scale of infrastructure development envisaged under the Plan.144 Additional fiscal resources are therefore required.
Increased petroleum, receipts would directly augment the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), which pursuant to section 21 of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815), supports expenditure in priority areas, many of which align with sectors covered by the GIP.
Enhanced petroleum revenues would thus place the GIP in a stronger position for effective implementation, with positive multiplier effects for national development and advancing the standard of living of the people.
Sustainable Development
From a sustainable development perspective, the proposed acquisition may also yield long term benefits. At first glance, it may appear paradoxical to identify increased petroleum production, often associated with resource depletion, as consistent with sustainable development objectives. However, this apparent contradiction can be reconciled on several grounds. has been identified as an advantage of the acquisition on the one hand, while sustainable development is simultaneously identified as another benefit.
First, increased state participation and control create a stronger basis for aligning petroleum operations with long-term national development planning and environmental protection objectives.
Second, greater public oversight enhances the State’s capacity to balance commercial imperatives with sustainability considerable.
Finally, increase petroleum earnings would augment the Ghana Petroleum Funds (Ghana Stabilization Fund and Ghana Heritage Fund), which are designed to act as buffers against, mitigate revenue volatility and address the challenges of resource depletion.145 Over time, this framework supports intergenerational equity and sustainable development.
Growth in Local Participation Levels in Petroleum Operations
Beyond fiscal gains, the proposed acquisition has the potential to enhance local content and local participation within Ghana’s petroleum industry. Although the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 and the Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations, 2013 (L.I. 2204) provide a robust framework for indigenous participation, implementation has remained sub-optimal.
This shortfall has been attributed to several factors such as non-compliance by oil companies, often justified by stabilisation clauses in petroleum agreements. For example, the Local Content Fund Secretariat has instances where some contractors and subcontractors failed to comply with the mandatory one per cent (1%) contribution to the Local Content Fund.146
Increased state participation and control would place the Government in a stronger position to enforce local content obligations and promote indigenous participation. This may be achieved through increased employment of Ghanaians, expanded opportunities for local subcontracting and greater utilisation of Indigenous Ghanaian Companies in petroleum operations.
The proposed acquisition presents significant potential benefits for the State and the Ghanaian people. However, the realization of these benefits will depend not merely on transfer of ownership, but on deliberate policy choices, effective institutional coordination and prudent management structures.
Potential Risks and Adverse Effects of the Acquisition by the State
Notwithstanding the potential benefits associated with the State’s proposed acquisition of the Company’s interests in the WTCP2 Block, the transaction is plagued with significant risks and potential adverse implications.
Fiscal Burden and Macroeconomic Constraints
A primary concern is the substantial financial burden the acquisition could impose on the State. Upstream petroleum operations are capital intensive and committing scarce public resources to an outright acquisition could increase the State’s indebtedness. The National Development Planning Commission, in its 2024 Annual Report, reported that over US$70 billion in cost overruns have been recorded across 18,000 capital projects, many of which have faced significant delays or have been abandoned.147
This raises a critical question: should the State pursue the proposed acquisition and assume additional financial obligations in light of its existing indebtedness? For context, when the government announced its intention to acquire Aker Energy in July 2021, the Minister of Energy submitted a memo to Parliament requesting US$1.65 billion for the government to finalize negotiations.148 Concerns were raised that the cost of the acquisition would be a shift of inadequate resources from more sustainable projects.149
The Natural Resource Governance Institute emphasized that, given the risky nature of such an undertaking, the cost is highly probable to be less meaningful.150 There is therefore a real likelihood and danger that the implementation of the State’s proposed acquisition could result in the diversion of funds from more sustainable and potentially beneficial investments, negatively affecting the population, particularly, if the anticipated benefits of the acquisition are not realized.
Risk of Acquiring Liabilities and Financial Exposure
Springfield’s reported debt exposure and its ongoing legal dispute with the Swiss commodities trader Petraco present serious concerns regarding contingent liabilities. The Imani Center for Policy & Education highlighted that GNPC could, through the acquisition, inadvertently assume financial obligations, unresolved commercial claims, or arbitration liabilities thereby, undermining the economic viability of the transaction.151
Conservatives have even argued that had the Company’s debts been sustainable, they would not have thought of a sale. Therefore, it will not be in the state’s interest to saddle itself with unssistainable debt obligations. To the extreme, this proposal has been deemed as a misplaced priority and overly ambitious project.
Geological and Technical Uncertainty
A critical challenge lies in the uncertainty surrounding the Afina resource base. According to the Imani Center for Policy & Education, the Company’s public claims of over one billion barrels of recoverable reserves has not been conclusively verified through a full independent appraisal programme under the supervision of the Petroleum Commission.152
Investment Climate and Expropriation Concerns
Although Springfield is an indigenous Ghanaian company, the acquisition could still raise concerns among investors, who may perceive it as state encroachment on private sector interests in the upstream petroleum sector. Combined with the broader decline in investment in the oil industry due to the global energy transition, this apprehension may lead to a reduction in foreign direct investment, ultimately hampering the production and development of the State’s petroleum reserves.
Exposure to Oil Price Volatility and Energy Transition Risks
Upstream petroleum investments are highly vulnerable to global oil price fluctuations, a risk amplified by the ongoing global energy transition. Ghana experienced this volatility in 2023, when petroleum receipts fell by 25.65 per cent from US$1,428.76 million in 2022 to US$1,062.32 million, largely due to a reduction in average crude oil prices per barrel.153 This is one of the reasons why the Natural Resource Governance Institute in 2021 described the State’s proposed acquisition of Aker Energy’s shares as a risky bet.154 As renewable energy sources gain prominence, anticipated revenues from the Afina well may not materialize, owing to potential reductions in average crude oil prices.
Political Risk and Policy Continuity
In Ghana, many initiatives and development projects experience delays or discontinuation following changes in government. For example, the Ghana Infrastructure Plan (GIP) originally completed in 2016 and revised in 2019155 remained shelved for several years and was only formally launched in 2025 after successive changes in government.
There is therefore a high likelihood that the acquisition of the Company’s interests, and the subsequent development of the Afina well, could face similar delays due to political transitions.
The governance structure of the GNPC does not adequately mitigate this risk. Under section 5 of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 (PNDCL 64), the GNPC’s Board consists of seven (7) members, six (6) of whom are appointed by the President on the advice of the Minister, one of whom is the Chairman. Without measures to confer greater independence on the GNPC, the Corporation remains highly susceptible to political influence and related risks.
Recommendations
To ensure that the State’s proposed acquisition of the Company’s interests advances national objectives and serve the best interest of the people of Ghana, several factors and measures should be reconsidered.
The foremost priority should be the design, funding, and execution of a comprehensive, independent appraisal programme for the Afina discovery.156 This process must be overseen by the Petroleum Commission as the primary regulator of the sector and should aim to generate reliable data to determine the commercial viability of the asset.157
Given current fiscal constraints, the acquisition should not rely solely on public funds or sovereign borrowing. The Government should explore sustainable financing options such as asset-backed financing, strategic partnerships, phased investment structures, and limited-recourse project finance. These mechanisms would reduce pressure on the national budget and align financial exposure with project performance.
To prevent excessive diversion of funds from other critical projects, priority expenditure areas financed through the Annual Budget Funding Amount should be maintained outside the energy sector.
The State acquisition of the Company’s interests should be strictly ring-fenced to the asset itself, explicitly excluding all liabilities which are not necessary for the acquisition.158 A comprehensive due diligence will minimize the likelihood of the State inheriting unforeseen liabilities.
To mitigate investor apprehension regarding perceived expropriation and investment risks, the Government should reaffirm its commitment to Ghana’s international investment obligations. Acquisition agreements should include stabilisation clauses and explicit protections against expropriation, consistent with bilateral investment treaties and international best practices.
Conclusion
The Ghana Infrastructure Plan and the State’s earlier “African Tiger” aspirations reflect the country’s long term vision for industrialization and economic independence. The proposed acquisition could accelerate the implementation of the GIP and advance Ghana’s broader development objectives, contributing to the realization of its 2057 vision.
However, without transparency, strong corporate governance, effective regulatory oversight, and prudent fiscal management, the acquisition could be the death knell to the Republic’s ambitions. The success of the transaction will therefore depend on a careful balance between strategic investment, risk management and sustainable development priorities.
Source notes — PDF page 48
109 BBC, ‘Ghana will be an African Tiger’ (BBC News, 19/06/2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6766527.stm accessed 20 Dec 2025.
Source notes — PDF page 50
accessed 21 December 2025. 111 Ibid. 112 Public Interest and Accountability Committee, ‘2024 Annual Report’ (Ghana Publishing Company 2025). 113 Section 23 of Act 821 defines petroleum resources as: existing petroleum, discovered petroleum reserves, undiscovered petroleum reserves, petroleum produced and petroleum under production. 114 Section 23 of Act 821 defines petroleum activities as: any activity related to the exploration for, development and production of petroleum, the acquisition of data and drilling of wells and the treatment, storage, pipeline transportation and decommissioning and the planning, design, construction, installation, operation and use of any facility for the purpose of the activities. 115 Renewable Energy Act, 2011 (Act 832), s 3.
Source notes — PDF page 51
120 Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815), s 53. 121 Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations 2013, (L.I 2204), reg 4. 122 Ibid. 123 Act 919, s 64. 124 Springfield Group, ‘Upstream’ (What We Do) <https://www.springfieldgroup.com/spring-field-upstream/> accessed 24 December 2025.
Source notes — PDF page 52
127 Mfonobong Nsehe, ‘Ghanaian Energy Mogul Kevin Okyere’s Springfield Faces Offshore Debt Scrutiny’ (Billionaires Africa, 17/12/2025) <https://www.billionaires.africa/2025/12/17/kevin-okyere-springfield-offshore-debt-ghana/> accessed 26 December 2025. 128 Ibid. 129 Public Interest and Accountability Committee, ‘2024 Annual Report’ (Ghana Publishing Company 2025). 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid.
Source notes — PDF page 53
niafrica.org/2025/11/imanis-brief-on-springfields-latest-dance-with-the-government-of-ghana/ - :~:text=Springfield's reported debt exposure and,, regulator-supervised independent appraisal.> accessed 30 December 2025. 135 Ministry of Finance, ‘The 2023 Reconciliation Report on the Petroleum Holding Fund’. 136 Ibid 137 Natural Resource Governance Institute, ‘Avoiding $ 1.6 Billion in Debt and Making Fossil Fuel Transitions in Ghana’ (Impact Story, 04/04/2024) <https://resourcegovernance.org/articles/avoiding-billions-debt-and-making-fossil-fuel-transitions-ghana - :~:text=In July 2021 Ghana's national,70 percent stake in SDWT.> accessed 21 December 2025. 138 Ibid 139 Ibid
Source notes — PDF page 54
140 The Ghana Heritage Fund is established under section 10 of Act 815 to provide endowment to support development for future generations when petroleum reserves have been depleted. 141 Ministry of Finance, (n 136).
Source notes — PDF page 55
142 National Development Planning Commission, ‘Ghana Infrastructure Plan (GIP) 2018-2047: Highlights’ (2019). 143 Ibid 144 Ibid
Source notes — PDF page 56
145 Act 815,, ss 9, 10 and 11. 146 Ministry of Finance, (n 136).
Source notes — PDF page 57
147 National Development Planning Commission, ‘2024 NDPC Annual Progress Report - Implementation of the NDPC’s Medium-Term Development Plan under the Framework: Agenda for Jobs II: Creating Prosperity and Equal Opportunity for All 2022-2025’ (2025). 148 Natural Resource Governance Institute, ‘Avoiding $ 1.6 Billion in Debt and Making Fossil Fuel Transitions in Ghana’ (Impact Story, 04/04/2024) https://resourcegovernance.org/articles/avoiding-billions-debt-and-making-fossil-fuel-transitions-ghana - :~:text=In July 2021 Ghana's national,70 percent stake in SDWT.> accessed 21 December 2025. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Imani Center for Policy & Education ‘IMANI’s Brief on Springfield’s Latest Dance with the Government of Ghana’ (Articles) <https://imaniafrica.org/2025/11/imanis-brief-on-springfields-latest-dance-with-the-government-of-ghana/ - :~:text=Springfield's reported debt exposure and,, regulator-supervised independent appraisal.> accessed 30 December 2025. 152Ibid
Source notes — PDF page 58
153 Ministry of Finance, (n 136). 154 Natural Resource Governance Institute, ‘Avoiding $ 1.6 Billion in Debt and Making Fossil Fuel Transitions in Ghana’ (Impact Story, 04/04/2024) <https://resourcegovernance.org/articles/avoiding-billions-debt-and-making-fossil-fuel-transitions-ghana - :~:text=In July 2021 Ghana's national,70 percent stake in SDWT.> accessed 21 December 2025. 155 The Presidency, ‘President Launches Ambitious Ghana Infrastructure Plan; A Renewed Vision for Dev’t through 2057’ (2025).
About this source
Transcribed from The Edfields Natural Resource Journal — July 2026, PDF pages 48–59. The original PDF retains the published layout, illustrations and references. Contributor roles are as printed in the publication. The cover reads July 2026; the editorial reads June 2026. The edition date remains under review.






