Environment & Sustainability

The effective management of revenue from natural resource exploitation: legal, economic, and institutional perspectives in Ghana

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Illustration reproduced from the Edfields Natural Resource Journal

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

The discovery of natural resources in commercial quantities is often met with celebration and optimism, as it is perceived to drive the economic prosperity of the nation. In Ghana, this sentiment was upheld when oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the Jubilee Field on 6 June 2007, triggering widespread national euphoria. Ghana is blessed with a variety of natural resources, including gold, bauxite, lithium, and diamonds. For a country once known as the Gold Coast, the addition of oil to its resource portfolio was regarded as a historic economic turning point, raising hopes of accelerated national development.

The anticipation of prosperity was immense; oil was hailed as a catalyst for job creation, infrastructure expansion, and long-term economic growth. This optimism was reinforced when Ghana marked its “first oil” on 28 November 2010, an event celebrated nationwide and symbolically linked to the country’s proud legacy of natural resource wealth.

Despite the optimism, there is an overriding duty to manage the revenues generated from natural resources effectively. Such management must ensure that resource wealth delivers lasting benefits, not only for the present generation but also for those to come. Without prudent governance, the fleeting nature of extractive resources risks leaving citizens with little more than environmental scars and unfulfilled promises.

However, the excitement that accompanies such discoveries can mask the deeper challenges of turning resource revenues into lasting benefits. Volatile commodity prices, governance weaknesses, and institutional gaps have too often meant that the promise of resource wealth is not fully realised, risking the repetition of the so-called “resource curse” seen in other nations.

The experience of other nations serves as a cautionary tale. Angola, the second-largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the continent’s wealthiest countries in resource terms, still records some of the highest under-five child mortality rates in the world.65

Despite its resource windfall, Angola’s inability to establish robust institutions for effective revenue management has meant that much of its population continues to live in poverty. This example underscores a broader reality: many resource-rich nations lack the governance structures needed to convert natural wealth into lasting prosperity. While a few jurisdictions, such as Botswana, Chile, Norway, and the U.S. state of Alaska, have demonstrated that resource wealth can be managed successfully, they remain the exception rather than the rule.

What is the Problem?

Recognising these challenges, Ghana has taken steps to avoid the pitfalls experienced by other resource-rich countries. Examples of such measures are the establishment of the Petroleum Revenue Management established by the Petroleum Revenue Act, 2011 (Act 815), Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF) through the MIIF Act, designed to collect and manage Petroleum revenue and manage and invest the country’s mineral revenues strategically.

Under Section 2 of the Act,66 the objects of the Fund are to:

a. Maximise the value of the income due to the Republic from the mineral wealth of the country for the benefit of its citizens; b. Monetise the minerals income accruing to the Republic in a beneficial, responsible, transparent, accountable, and sustainable manner; and c. Develop and implement measures to reduce the budgetary exposure of the Republic to fluctuations in minerals income.

Recent improvements in macroeconomic management, combined with fresh analytical thinking that takes account of the specific circumstances of developing countries, offer hope that natural resource revenues can drive poverty reduction and growth. The decision of how much of their resource revenue flow to consume and how much to save and invest saddles resource-rich developing countries with difficult trade-offs.

For advanced economies rich in natural resources, it may be optimal to save or invest resource revenues in financial assets abroad and then to consume a constant portion of resource wealth each period, equal to the permanent income on their total resource wealth. This is known as the permanent-income approach.67

However, the Government, through the 2025 Budget Statement, has proposed an amendment to the MIIF Act to redirect 80% of the Fund’s mineral royalties into the Consolidated Fund for infrastructure development. This proposal exemplifies how legal, and policy decisions can compromise the Fund’s long-term objectives. Analysts warn that such a move could severely weaken MIIF’s capacity to invest in high-yield assets, effectively undermining its statutory purpose and exposing the country to the boom-and-bust cycles seen in other resource-rich nations.

LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES

The laws governing the extractive sector, including the Minerals and Mining Act68, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act69, the Environmental Protection Act70, and the Minerals Income and Investment Funds Act71, often operate in silos. This fragmentation can lead to conflicting mandates, duplication of efforts, and gaps in enforcement. While the MIIF Act focuses on the investment of mineral revenues, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act governs the oil sector, and there is no overarching legal instrument to integrate the governance of all extractive resources under a unified vision.

a. Overreliance on Commodity Revenues

Ghana’s fiscal framework remains heavily dependent on mineral and petroleum revenues, making the economy vulnerable to commodity price volatility. Sharp declines in gold or oil prices can significantly reduce government revenue, force sudden budget adjustments and limit the scope for long-term investment. The proposed diversion of MIIF funds exacerbates this vulnerability by eroding the Fund’s capacity to serve as a buffer against commodity price shocks.

One critical point the Honourable Minister may have overlooked is that the Fund was deliberately created to mitigate such volatility. Redirecting these resources for purposes beyond their intended mandate is a slippery slope towards the very “resource curse” the MIIF was designed to avert.

b. Limited Diversification of Investment Portfolios

Although the MIIF’s mandate includes building a sustainable investment portfolio, there is limited public information on the diversification of its holdings. Heavy concentration in the extractive sector risks reinforcing the very volatility the Fund seeks to mitigate. Diverting 80% of the Fund to immediate spending further limits its ability to pursue diversified, long-term investment strategies.

a. Institutional Capacity Constraints

For the MIIF to succeed, it must be supported by skilled professionals capable of managing complex investment strategies, conducting due diligence, and ensuring compliance with international best practices. Institutional capacity gaps in technical expertise, financial modelling, and risk management remain a concern, and a sudden transfer of funds could strain these capacities further by constraining operational resources.

b. Transparency and Public Engagement

Despite statutory provisions on accountability, public awareness of the MIIF’s operations, investment decisions, and performance remains low. Without robust citizen engagement and transparent reporting, there is a risk of public mistrust and reduced scrutiny of fund management. The proposed fund transfer may fuel public scepticism about the government’s commitment to long-term resource management.

c. Risk of Political Interference

As with many sovereign wealth and natural resource funds, political influence in investment decisions can undermine long-term objectives. Short-term political priorities, particularly during election cycles, may take precedence over sustainable wealth preservation. The 80% fund transfer is a tangible example of such interference, prioritising immediate infrastructure spending over strategic wealth accumulation and intergenerational equity.

POLICY AND MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE 80% MIIF FUND TRANSFER

The government's proposal to transfer 80% of the Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF) into the Consolidated Fund for infrastructure development raises significant macroeconomic concerns. While the intent is to address immediate fiscal needs, this policy could have long-term detrimental effects on Ghana's economic stability and growth prospects.

Erosion of Sovereign Wealth and Investment Capacity

The MIIF was established to manage mineral royalties, ensuring that Ghana's resource wealth contributes to sustainable development. By diverting a substantial portion of these funds, the government diminishes the nation's ability to invest in high-yield assets, potentially leading to a depletion of sovereign wealth. This reduction in investment capacity could hinder future economic growth and the ability to respond to economic shocks.

Increased Fiscal Vulnerability

While the immediate fiscal deficit may appear to improve by reallocating funds, this approach does not address the underlying structural issues. Relying on one-time transfers from resource revenues can lead to increased fiscal vulnerability, especially if commodity prices fluctuate or if there is a downturn in the mining sector. Sustainable fiscal health requires consistent and diversified revenue streams, which this policy undermines.

Potential for Inflationary Pressures

The infusion of a significant amount of funds into the Consolidated Fund could lead to increased government spending. Without corresponding increases in domestic production, this could result in inflationary pressures, eroding the purchasing power of citizens and potentially leading to macroeconomic instability.

Impact on Investor Confidence

International investors closely monitor a country's management of its natural resources. The decision to divert a substantial portion of MIIF funds may signal to investors a lack of commitment to long-term economic planning and resource management. This perception could lead to reduced foreign direct investment and capital outflows, adversely affecting economic growth and business interests in Ghana.

Long-Term Development Implications

While the policy aims to fund infrastructure development, it is crucial to consider the opportunity cost. The funds allocated to short-term infrastructure projects could have been invested in long-term assets that generate returns over time. Diverting these funds may result in missed opportunities for sustainable development and wealth generation for future generations.

In conclusion, while the government's proposal to transfer 80% of MIIF funds into the consolidated fund may provide short-term fiscal relief, it poses significant risks to Ghana's long-term economic stability and growth. A more balanced approach, focusing on both immediate needs and long-term investments, would be prudent to ensure sustainable development and economic resilience.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS & SAFEGUARDS

To ensure that Ghana’s mineral wealth delivers sustainable benefits, a combination of legal, economic, and institutional measures must be implemented. These solutions aim to protect the Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF), strengthen governance, and maximise the long-term value of resource revenues.

The experience of global success stories suggests that natural resource wealth management requires a commitment to three interrelated principles: fiscal transparency, a rules-based fiscal policy, and strong institutions for public financial management. These principles provide the foundation for sustainable management and can guide Ghana in strengthening MIIF’s role as a long-term sovereign wealth fund.

Legal and Regulatory Safeguards

The following are essential to legally regulate the management of these funds:

a. Amend the MIIF Act to clearly limit the transfer of funds for short-term expenditures, ensuring that a core portion is ring-fenced for long-term investment. b. Harmonise existing laws governing mining, petroleum, and resource revenues to avoid conflicting mandates and ensure cohesive oversight. c. Mandate full disclosure of mineral contracts and revenue allocations, increasing public scrutiny and accountability. d. Equip regulatory agencies with the independence, authority, and resources necessary to enforce compliance and deter mismanagement or corruption. e. Government must sign agreements with Multinational mining companies to use their funds to provide some basic amenities for the mining communities.

Economic Measures

In terms of economic measures to sustain a robust investment and/or profitable management of the funds, government may: a. Allow MIIF to invest strategically in diversified, high-yield domestic and international assets to buffer against commodity price volatility. b. Adopt a hybrid approach that allocates a portion of resource revenues to immediate infrastructure and social development needs while preserving the majority for investment growth. c. Implement policies that protect other sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing, from currency appreciation due to resource inflows.

Institutional Strengthening

There is also the need to build and strengthen institutions mandated to manage resources in the country for and on behalf of the people. To achieve this, it will be useful to :

a. Develop specialised technical and financial expertise within MIIF and related regulatory bodies to manage complex investments and evaluate risks effectively. b. Establish an autonomous board with professional and civic representation to oversee fund management, investment strategy, and reporting. c. Foster citizen participation and transparent reporting mechanisms to build trust and ensure that resource wealth benefits both local communities and the nation at large; and d. Introduce clear metrics and regular audits to evaluate MIIF’s performance, linking outcomes to the Fund’s statutory objectives.

Learning from Global Best Practices

Benchmark Against Successful Funds: Adopt lessons from Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) and Bahrain’s Mumtalakat Fund, where long-term investment strategies have protected wealth from short-term political pressures. We also need to avoid sudden large-scale transfers of MIIF resources; instead, implement phased allocation models that maintain fund integrity while contributing to development projects

CONCLUSION

Ghana’s experience with natural resource management underscores the critical importance of strong institutions, clear legal frameworks, and disciplined fiscal policies. The establishment of the MIIF and the Petroleum Revenue Management framework represents a deliberate attempt to harness resource revenues sustainably, mitigate commodity price volatility, and ensure intergenerational equity.

However, the proposed diversion of 80% of MIIF funds into the Consolidated Fund threatens to undermine these objectives, exposing the country to fiscal instability and the classic boom-and-bust cycles associated with resource dependent economies. Preserving the integrity of the MIIF, adhering to rules-based fiscal management, and following macroeconomic principles such as the permanent income approach are essential to converting Ghana’s mineral wealth into a long-term engine of sustainable growth, poverty reduction, and economic transformation.

Source notes — PDF page 28

65Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores, Sharing the Wealth, Finance & Development December 2014, Vol. 51, No. 4 66Minerals Income and Investment Fund Act, 2018 (Act 978).

Source notes — PDF page 29

67IMF, Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource-Rich Developing Countries (Policy Paper, 2012); IMF, Norway’s Fiscal Framework: Building Resilience for the Future (IMF Country Report No 21/97, 2021) 68Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703) 69Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) 70Environmental Protection Act, 2025 (Act 1124) 71Ibid, 2

About this source

Transcribed from The Edfields Natural Resource Journal — September 2025, PDF pages 27–33. The original PDF retains the published layout, illustrations and references. Contributor roles are as printed in the publication.

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