Energy & Natural Resources
Cash Waterfall Mechanism: Its application and role in achieving power stability in Ghana

Introduction
Introduction
Unstable electricity supply has consistently posed a major challenge for successive governments in Ghana. How sustainable power is in Ghana has become an important benchmark by which the government’s performance in economic management and infrastructure development is often assessed. A stable electricity supply is essential not only for domestic consumption but also for industrial productivity, investment growth, and overall national development. This justifies the government’s decision to invest USD 5.7million over the period between 2019 and 2024 in stabilization payments alone57.
Historically, power shortages in Ghana can be traced back several decades. For instance, in 1983, the country experienced a major electricity crisis caused by prolonged drought conditions, which reduced water levels at the Akosombo Dam, thereby limiting hydroelectric generation58.
In 2004, the withdrawal of Kaiser Aluminum from the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO) arrangement adversely affected the revenue generation of the Volta River Authority (VRA), further placing pressure on the electricity sector. By 2012, the country was again compelled to implement a nationwide load-shedding programme as power generation struggled to keep pace with rising demand.
Over the years, Ghana has experienced recurring electricity supply interruptions widely referred to as “dumsor.” The term, which derives from the Akan words connoting “putting light on and off,” became synonymous with the persistent and unpredictable power outages that affected households, businesses, and public institutions across the country. These outages, particularly between 2012 and 2015, significantly disrupted economic activities and highlighted deep structural weaknesses within the energy sector.
In addition to operational challenges, Ghana’s energy sector has faced severe financial constraints arising largely from the accumulation of significant debts owed to Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and gas suppliers.
Government Efforts to Stabilize Electricity in Ghana
The government’s deep concern for this sector and its unwavering efforts to stabilize the energy sector are trite. The most recent one happened in April 2026, where, by the joint effort of engineers and other stakeholders, the turbines at the Akosombo Dam that were significantly affected by a fire at the Volta River Authority (VRA) switchyard control room, were duly restored to their generation capacity.
Various governments have implemented initiatives aimed at improving generation capacity, expanding access to electricity, and strengthening the governance framework of the sector. Among these initiatives was the establishment of the Northern Electrification Department within the Volta River Authority in 1987 as part of the Northern Electrification Scheme aimed at expanding electricity access to the northern regions of Ghana.
Subsequent institutional reforms include the creation of the Northern Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCo) in 1997, the establishment of the Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo) in 2006, to be responsibility for electricity transmission, and the gradual opening of the generation segment of the electricity to private sector participation, allowing Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to supplement public generation capacity.
In an effort to address mounting financial obligations in the sector, the government enacted the Energy Sector Levies Act (ESLA)59 and subsequently established the ESLA PLC, a special purpose vehicle mandated to issue long-term bonds, widely known as ESLA Bonds, to resolve energy sector debts owed to banks and trade creditors.60
Notwithstanding these measures, the energy sector continues to face liquidity constraints that affect the timely settlement of obligations owed to participants across the electricity value chain. As a result, additional financial management mechanisms became necessary to ensure that revenues generated from electricity sales were allocated in a transparent, structured, and predictable manner.
One such intervention was the introduction of the Cash Waterfall Mechanism (CWM), which formed part of broader reforms aimed at improving revenue distribution and restoring financial discipline within Ghana’s electricity sector. This article, therefore, examines the Cash Waterfall Mechanism as a policy instrument designed to promote financial stability within Ghana’s power sector. In doing so, the article explains the concept of the cash waterfall mechanism, its implementation within the electricity value chain, as well as the successes that have been reaped since its inception and limitations experienced in applying the concept to address the sector’s persistent financial challenges.
Conceptual Framework of the Cash Waterfall Mechanism
It must be noted that before the CWM, the government had experimented with the concept of Cross Debt Clearing House (CDCH) that sought to settle inter-utility and government debts emanating from payment gaps in the energy Sector61.
Unfortunately, the unsustainable nature of the policy led to its suspension in 2012. The Cash Waterfall Mechanism is different in letter and in spirit from the Cross Debt Clearing House.
A Cash Waterfall payment structure refers to a financial arrangement in which revenues collected within a system are distributed sequentially according to predetermined priority levels. Under such a structure, obligations classified as higher priority are settled first before payments are made to other beneficiaries further down the payment hierarchy.62 In layman’s language, it is a system by which persons who are highly owed are paid first, both principal and interest, before the lower-tiered creditors.63
In the context of debt servicing and financial management, this mechanism ensures that critical obligations such as “senior debt”, operational costs, or statutory payments are satisfied before residual revenues are distributed to other stakeholders. The system therefore promotes transparency, predictability, and structured allocation of funds within complex financial arrangements.64
Within Ghana’s electricity sector, the Cash Waterfall Mechanism was designed to regulate the manner in which revenues collected from electricity sales are distributed among institutions participating in the power value chain, including generators, transmitters, distributors, regulators, and other sector entities, especially in satisfaction of debts that have accrued over the years and recently.
Implementation of the Cash Waterfall Mechanism
The Cash Waterfall Mechanism (CWM) was implemented in April 2020 as part of the Energy Sector Recovery Program (ESRP).
The ESRP is a broader policy initiative aimed at addressing financial imbalances within the electricity sector65. The CWM was specifically intended to improve the allocation of revenues generated from electricity sales by ensuring that payments are made to stakeholders according to an established order of priority.
The implementation of the CWM was particularly directed at addressing the revenue shortfalls experienced by the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) and the Northern Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCo). Surprisingly, at the end of 2015, the Government of Ghana was reported to have owed ECG to the tune of GH¢ 950million in subsidies and non-payment of bills by state institutions including ministries, departments, and agencies (MMDAs) while the private sector and individuals also owed ECG some GH¢ 610 million.66
Indeed, in March 2024, the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission published that the overall distribution losses for ECG, which the Commission approved, based on the 21.4% loss levels, amounted to 3,676 GWh; estimated at GHS 2.46339 billion. Similarly, the approved overall distribution losses for NEDCO, based on the same 21.4% loss levels, amounted to 486 GWh; estimated at GHS 327.22million.67
A significant portion of these distribution losses to ECG and NEDCO has been attributed to non-payment of revenue by consumers and a poor tariff structure, which does not create the necessary platform for the utility companies to recover the cost of electricity produced and distributed.68
Prior to the introduction of the mechanism, the distribution of revenues collected from electricity consumers lacked a clearly defined structure, as earlier intimated. As a result, payments to stakeholders were often made on a discretionary basis, which created uncertainty and inequities within the sector. While some institutions received full payments for services rendered, others received partial payments or experienced significant delays in the settlement of outstanding obligations.69
These challenges were further compounded by several structural issues within the sector, including excess generation capacity relative to demand, outstanding electricity bills owed by public institutions, tariff levels that did not fully reflect the cost of electricity production, and delays in the implementation of the Automatic Adjustment Formula (AAF).70
The Automatic Adjustment Formula is a pricing mechanism employed by the government through PURC to reduce the financial burden on consumers, which largely emanates from the policy of a one-time tariff adjustment. The AAF was also reintroduced to ensure the financial viability of the Utility Service Providers through fair pricing, transparency, and equity in the provision of utility services in the country.
Over time, these aforementioned structural issues contributed to the accumulation of significant debts owed to power generators and fuel suppliers. A financial assessment conducted by the Ministry of Energy, with support from the Power Africa Transaction and Reforms Programme (PATRP), projected that the payment gap within Ghana’s electricity sector could exceed USD 12.5 billion by 2023 if corrective measures were not implemented.71
Although the introduction of the Cash Waterfall Mechanism contributed to some improvement in the management of sector revenues, concerns regarding payment predictability and equitable distribution persisted. In response to these concerns, the President of the Republic at the time, Nana Akufo-Addo, in June 2023, directed a revision of the Cash Waterfall Mechanism to improve its operational efficiency.
Under the revised framework, payments were categorized into two distinct tiers: Level A and Level B, where Level A payments were prioritized and made directly by ECG to IPPs, while Level B payments were allocated to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other sector institutions.72 This two-tier system reinforced the principle of prioritizing critical obligations within the payment hierarchy73.
Additional reforms included the requirement for the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission to publish monthly reports detailing revenue disbursements under the CWM. The Ministry of Energy was further mandated to address any payment shortfalls that might arise after the allocation of revenues among beneficiaries.74
Successes from the Implementation of the Cash Waterfall Mechanism The Cash Waterfall Mechanism has served a number of benefits to Ghana’s energy sector, which include providing predictability and structure in payments made to IPPS and State-Owned Enterprises. The system is predictable, such that creditors know who and how much is projected to be paid for each month.
Also, the crippling sector debt, comprising legacy and currently incurred debts, has been reduced due to the application of the CWM. According to PURC’s Cash Waterfall Mechanism validation report for December 2025, a total amount of Eight Hundred Thirty-Eight Million, Five Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand, and Nine Hundred Five Ghana Cedis (GH₵ 838,539,905.00) representing the total payment due the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and the West African Gas Pipeline Company Limited (WAPCo) as Level A was deducted from the revenue collected by ECG.
The Remaining Eight Hundred and Twenty-Nine Million, and Forty-Eight Thousand and Twenty-Eight Ghana Cedis Eighty-One Pesewas (GH₵829,048,028.81) after deducting payments to the IPPs and statutory payment of One Hundred and Eighteen Million, Four Hundred and Thirty-Five Thousand, Four Hundred and Thirty-Two Ghana Cedis, Sixty-Nine Pesewas (GH₵118,435,432.69) was allocated to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and regulators, in Level B.
The total actual revenue approved to Level A beneficiaries stood at USD 75,544,135.64 (equivalent to GH₵ 838,539,905.61) at the time whereas the total actual revenue payment to the Level B beneficiaries stood at GH₵829,048,028.82.
Implementation Shortfalls
It is interesting to note that in 2024, in a letter addressed to the Presidency, Energy and Finance Ministries, the PURC called for further revisions of the Cash Water Mechanism albeit the 2023 revision.
According to the PURC, this revision is necessary due to financial instability, which could result in the imminent collapse of the energy sector. The Commission’s concern focused on both IPPs and government entities, who were struggling financially as monies projected to be collected by ECG often fell short, and ECG’s failure to fully comply with the dictates of CWM. According to the Commission, this is further exacerbated by exchange rate discrepancies and the Ministry of Finance's (MoF) failure to consistently make the agreed-upon $10 million monthly top-up payments75.
Even though ECG explained that delays in payments to IPPs were standard practices and not in breach or non-compliance with the Cash Waterfall Mechanism76, the effect of such financial shortfalls cannot be underestimated.
Sunon Asogli Power (Ghana) Limited, an independent power provider, was reported to have indefinitely shut down its 560MW plant. In a press release dated October 16, 2024, the company stated that the decision to shut down was a result of delays in payments by ECG77.
Fast forward to 2026, in a statement published by the Ministry of Finance dated 12th January 2026, the government has cleared its USD 1.470 billion energy sector debt. The statement made further asserted that, aside from clearing the inherited arrears, the Government has remained current on largely all IPP invoices for 2025 through the careful implementation of the cash waterfall payment structure.78 The true state of the energy sector can be judged by all stakeholders, to which the impact of the government’s victory in clearing its age-long debt should be felt by all.
Recently there have been some breakdowns of vital machines and even certain turbines catching fire at Akosombo. All these are largely associated with improper or insufficient maintenance culture, which is primarily influenced by financial shortfalls. Therefore, it is evident that there are loopholes within the CWM that need urgent attention.
Conclusion
Progress has been made with the introduction of the cash waterfall mechanism. It has introduced predictability and structure into the sector towards the management of debt obligations and the production and distribution of electricity in Ghana. Notwithstanding, the path forward for Ghana’s energy sector depends on strengthening and refining the Cash Waterfall Mechanism alongside broader sector reforms. Continuous monitoring, improved tariff alignment, enhanced revenue collection, and strong political and institutional commitment are necessary to maximise its effectiveness.
When integrated with investments in infrastructure, renewable energy, and sound regulatory oversight, the Cash Waterfall Mechanism can serve as a cornerstone for a financially viable, resilient, and sustainable power sector supporting Ghana’s economic growth and long-term energy security.
Source notes — PDF page 19
57Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Brief, Back to Basics: Understanding the Cahs Waterfall Mechanism and its Application in Ghana’s Electricity Sector, (Issue 12, October 2024) < https://shorturl.at/vCCCs> accessed 7 April 2026. 58Cornelis Kweku Affre ‘We had prolonged electricity blackouts...worse than dumsor’ – Prof. Neequaye recounts 1983 experience: (MyJoyOnline, 25 February 2023)< https://www.myjoyonline.com/we-had-prolonged-electricity-blackouts-worse-than-dumsor-prof-neequaye-recounts-1983-experience/> accessed 10 May 2026.
Source notes — PDF page 20
59 Energy Sector Levies Act, 2015 (Act 899) as amended by the Energy Sector Levies (Amendment) Act, 2025 (Act 1141). 60 History of Ghana’s Energy Sector (2005): <https://shorturl.at/lZkV5> accessed 10 May 2026
Source notes — PDF page 21
61 Asante, N. D. ‘The Cash Waterfall mechanism (CWM): Part 1: The Power Sector Payment Gap – Genesis of the CWM’, (B&FT Online, 29 January 2024) <https://shorturl.at/QRWxY> accessed 10 May 2026. 62 Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC), Cash Waterfall Mechanism Validation, Report for October 2024 Payment. 63 Peprah, A. ‘Strategic restructuring for efficiency. Strategic Restructuring for Efficiency: Proposing the Division and Partial Privatization of Ghana’s ECG’ – (MyJoyOnline, 23 January 2024) < https://www.myjoyonline.com/strategic-restructuring-for-efficiency-proposing-the-division-and-partial-privatization-of-ghanas-ecg/> accessed 7 May 2026. 64 PURC (n62).
Source notes — PDF page 22
65Anthony Manu, Explainer: What is the Cash Waterfall Mechanism? (Myjoyonline 24 April 2024) <https://shorturl.at/579Tc> accessed 10 May 2026. 66 Seth J. Bokpe, ‘Government owes ECG GH¢728 million; Repayment to be spread over 5 years — Terkper’. (GRAPHIC ONLINE, 23 August 2016): <https://shorturl.at/K9Q88> accessed 10 May 2026. 67 Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, ‘An analysis of Ghana’s electricity distribution losses in recent years (2021-2023)’ (Regulatory Briefing, Issue 8 March 2024). 68 Ebenezer Nyarko Kumi. 2017. ‘The Electricity Situation in Ghana: Challenges and Opportunities.’ CGD Policy Paper. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. <https://shorturl.at/kydCZ> accessed 7 May 2026. 69 Charles Kollo, ‘The Cash Waterfall Mechanism (CWM): The Causes, Consequences and Expert Recommendations’, Published on August 28, 2025. 70 Ibid.
Source notes — PDF page 23
71 Anthony (n65). 72 Public Utility Regulatory Commission, Updated Cash Waterfall Model, August 2023. 73 Ibid 74 Ibid
Source notes — PDF page 24
75 Anthony Manu, ‘PURC calls for urgent revision of the Cash Waterfall Mechanism’ (Myjoyonline, 19 September 2024) <https://shorturl.at/gMSVQ> accessed 10 May 2026. 76 Ibid. 77 Sugnon Asogli Power, Press statement: ‘Sugnon Asogli 560MW Power Plant Shutdown’ (16 October 2025) (GhanaWeb, 17 October 2025)) <https://shorturl.at/DDX33> accessed 10 May 2026. 78 Ministry of Finance, ‘Mahama Administration pays US$ 1.470 Billion to Clear Energy Sector Debt and Restore World Bank Guarantee within First Year’ (12 January 2026) <https://shorturl.at/vWjhm> accessed 8 May 2026.
Source notes — PDF page 25
59Per Section 81 of Act 691, whereas the ex-refinery price means the amount of money equivalent to the actual cost of importing finished petroleum products and not exceeding the import parity price, the ex-pump price means the price at which a given quantity of a petroleum product is sold at a retail station dispensing pump 60Petroleum Pricing Guidelines 2024 61Regulations 7 – 11, National Petroleum Authority (Prescribed Petroleum Pricing Formula) Regulations, 2012 (L.I 2186); Petroleum Pricing Guidelines 2024
About this source
Transcribed from The Edfields Natural Resource Journal — July 2026, PDF pages 19–25. The original PDF retains the published layout, illustrations and references. Contributor roles are as printed in the publication. The cover reads July 2026; the editorial reads June 2026. The edition date remains under review.






