Mining & Natural Resources

Ghana’s lithium agreement: 6 key points to consider and reconsider

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11 mins (approx.)

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Illustration reproduced from the Edfields Natural Resource Journal

Introduction

As the global green energy transition accelerates, critical minerals like lithium have become central to emerging technologies, electric vehicles, and large-scale energy storage systems. Ghana, with its recent discovery of significant lithium reserves, has stepped into the global spotlight.

In 2012, Barari DV Ghana Limited, a subsidiary of Atlantic Lithium, an Australian exploration and development company was granted a reconnaissance licence from exploration in the Ewoyaa concession. This exploration led to the discovery of high-grade lithium in commercial quantities in 2017. Following this breakthrough, the reconnaissance licence was converted to a mining prospecting licence on 23rd March 2018 enabling the company to undertake further assessments and feasibility studies.

Five years later, in October 2023, Barari DV was granted a mining lease under the Green Minerals Policy, giving them the exclusive right to mine and process lithium for export in the Ewoyaa lithium deposit in the Mfantseman Municipality for a term of fifteen (15) years8.

While the agreement represents a significant milestone in Ghana’s extractive sector, it also raises critical questions about equity, long-term national benefit, and regulatory compliance. This article distills the agreement into six key points for consideration or reconsideration.

Reconsider: Equity Stake – Who Really Owns the Resource?

The Government of Ghana negotiated a 13% free carried interest, supplemented by an additional 6% additional stake acquired through the Minerals Income Investment Fund (MIIF), bringing the total state interest to 19% in the lithium venture. While this surpasses the standard 10% free carried interest mandated under the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703), it remains modest in comparison to setups seen elsewhere in Africa.

In Namibia, policymakers are currently considering a bold new proposal that would require a 51% Namibian ownership stake in all new mining projects, signifying a serious policy shift toward domestic control and benefit-sharing over critical resources9.

Zimbabwe offers an even starker contrast. The state-owned entities, Kuvimba Mining Household controls approximately 65% of the Santawana lithium mine, a flagship project in the country’s growing battery mineral sector10.

In addition, Chinese companies, Sino mine and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt have collectively invested over USD 1 billion in Zimbabwe’s lithium industry, including a $270 million lithium concentrator designed to remain under substantial public ownership after completion. These arrangements demonstrate how host countries can leverage resource endowments for not only immediate revenue but also industrial development and value retention11.

Under Act 703, Ghana is also required to promote local participation beyond state equity. While Barari DV Ghana Ltd. has pledged to prioritise local employment and supplier development, critics point out that this is not the same as true local ownership. Without significant domestic stakes, whether through community trusts, local equity partners, or public-private joint ventures, Ghana risks remaining primarily an exporter of raw lithium, with most value addition occurring offshore. The question looms: Does a 19% stake truly reflect the full strategic value of Ghana’s emerging lithium wealth?

Reconsider: Value Addition Clauses – Genuine Industrialization or Lip Service?

The Agreement mandates that Barari DV Ghana Ltd. establish a lithium hydroxide processing plant in Ghana, signalling a commitment to value addition rather than mere raw ore exports. On the surface, this signals forward-thinking inclusion of industrial development in the contract.

However, significant concerns remain about Ghana’s current industrial and logistical capacity to sustain such a capital-intensive operation. Lithium processing is highly energy-dependent and demands advanced infrastructure. Without clear timelines, government-backed guarantees, or a robust industrial policy framework, this clause risks being symbolic or waived as “infeasible” by the company.

A powerful cautionary tale lies with the Ghana Manganese Company Limited (GMCL). Despite contractual obligations to establish on-site value addition, namely a smelter, GMCL failed to deliver. In 2019, the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources ordered a shutdown of operations12, citing:

• Failure to build the required smelter, undermining value-addition mandates. • Defaults on financial obligations, including annual mineral rights fees over $4 million. • Losses to the state estimated at: - $12.8 million in additional royalties, - $79 million in corporate taxes, - $6.1 million in non-transferred dividends, - $259 million in revenues held offshore via transfer-pricing loopholes, - Plus $3.64 million from manipulation of sales agreements

This case underscores Ghana’s recurring issue of failing to enforce value-addition commitments in mineral contracts. Without real enforcement capacity, value addition clauses are vulnerable to non-compliance and abuse. Will lithium be any different?

Reconsider: Royalties and Tax Benefits – Is the State Getting a Fair Share?

Under the Ewoyaa lithium agreement, the Government of Ghana has secured a 10% royalty rate on total revenues from mineral sales in the lease area—significantly higher than the 6% maximum prescribed under Section 25 of the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703).

While this headline rate is commendable and positions Ghana above its legislative benchmark, the structure of the royalty is crucial. The agreement does not clearly indicate whether the 10% is fixed or progressive, that is, whether it scales with profit margins or global lithium prices. This distinction is critical, given the volatility of commodity markets.

The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) advocates for variable-rate royalty systems to maximize public benefit. Fixed royalties can be regressive during periods of low profitability (when the state’s take still burdens operators) and suboptimal during price booms (when the state fails to capture windfall gains). NRGI recommends13:

• Price benchmarks tied to recognized indices (e.g., Spodumene CIF index for lithium). • Caps on interest deductions to prevent aggressive tax avoidance. • Non-dilution clauses to protect state equity. • Clear dividend-sharing rules to ensure timely payments.

While Ghana’s deal is stronger than typical royalty terms, other mineral rich countries adapt progressive models: Chile applies a sliding-scale royalty; between 8% and 26% for copper, depending on metal prices14. Mali also recently raised its royalty on gold from 6% to 10.5% and increased state equity in new projects to 35%, drawing mixed feedback from mining CEOs who warn this may deter investment.15

The 10% royalty, while above legislative minimum, may be insufficient over time especially if fixed. Ghana risks losing out on a better fiscal take unless the terms include scalability and transparency in tax treatment. With price volatility in lithium markets, a progressive royalty and clear tax framework would shield Ghana from revenue erosion and enhance long-term benefits.

Reconsider: Environmental and Social Safeguards

The lithium agreement mandates the establishment of a Community Development Fund (CDF) and a Community Development Agreement (CDA) as part of its environmental and social safeguards. These are commendable in their intent but without clearly defined regulatory parameters, they risk being hollow commitments.

To protect and empower affected communities such as Ewoyaa, Krampakrom, Afrangua, and Krofu, the CDA should be made mandatory and include:

• Community oversight and monitoring mechanisms, to enable local participation in implementation and accountability. • A grievance redress system, allowing residents to lodge complaints about Barari's performance under the CDA or the broader environmental and social framework. • Mine closure and sustainability provisions, ensuring post-closure benefits and rehabilitation are embedded from the outset.

Currently the Residents of Ewoyaa and surrounding villages including Krampakrom, Afrangua, Krofu face the threat of displacement without transparent resettlement plans. Construction has partially begun; areas have been demarcated and locals barred from farming or expanding their homes yet there is little communication on fair compensation or resettlement plans16. Though the Parliament is yet to ratify the grant of the mining lease to Barari DV, residents have been left in a limbo with little to no information about their fate. Leaving these obligations entirely to the company risks a flawed process that could undermine expected benefits to communities

Moreover, Ghana’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has approved the project’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), following public hearings in Ewoyaa and Krofu, signalling procedural compliance17. Nonetheless, the broader concern remains: does the EPA, and the Minerals Commission, truly have the technical capacity, logistical resources, and political independence to enforce these safeguards? Past extractive projects in Ghana have revealed limits in enforcement, often yielding reactive or compromised oversight.

Environmental risks in mining are significant, particularly water pollution, soil erosion, and biodiversity loss, as mining operations can disrupt ecosystems and contaminate water bodies with chemicals or silt. In communities dependent on the Ochi-Amissah River, such risks are heightened by potential brine-related contamination from lithium extraction.

Consider: Transparency and Parliamentary Oversight.

As required by Article 268(1) of the Constitution and Section 5(4) of Act the Minerals and Mining Act, the government has presented its mining lease with Barari DV to parliament for ratification. The Committee on Mines and Energy is currently considering the agreement before it proceeds to a wider parliamentary debate.

However, this proposed deal has ignited a significant debate on transparency, accountability, and parliamentary oversight among civil society and governance experts, including ACEP, IMANI, and the NRGI. Critics argue that the agreement bypassed essential transparency protocols by being negotiated directly with Atlantic Lithium/Barari DV without an open, competitive tender process, raising doubts about whether Ghana obtained the most favourable terms.

Concerns also extend to limited public disclosure. While headline terms such as a 13% royalty and state equity participation have been publicised, the full agreement and key annexes including the feasibility study, detailed cost structures, environmental mitigation plans, and refined chemical specifications, were not made publicly accessible during the critical review stage. This lack of disclosure has hindered independent technical and public scrutiny.

Further controversy arose when Atlantic Lithium, in representations to its investors, disclosed that the company had secured a 10-year tax holiday and electricity tariffs 30–50% below standard industrial rates, terms that were not explicitly highlighted in the government’s public communications.

This suggests its subsidiary company, Barari DV has been registered in Ghana as a “free zone” entity, a designation not typically granted to mining companies18.

Observers have also questioned whether the legislative process is being unduly expedited. Given the strategic significance of Ghana’s lithium resources, many argue that Parliament should resist rubber-stamping the agreement and instead ensure thorough deliberation, structured public consultation, and possibly an independent technical audit before any vote is taken.

Reconsider: Strategic Vision or Short-Term Deal?

One of the core debates around the lithium agreement is whether it reflects a long-term strategic vision or a short-term revenue grab. A “resource-for-now” approach risks prioritizing immediate fiscal gains over the sustainable management of a finite resource.

This could leave Ghana with depleted reserves, minimal local industrial capacity, and lingering environmental damage. By contrast, a “resource-for-the-future” approach would prioritize:

• Maximizing local value addition (e.g., refining and battery production within Ghana).

• Investing revenues into diversified economic sectors. • Aligning extraction timelines with long-term national development goals.

Lithium is a strategic mineral for the global clean energy transition, powering batteries for electric vehicles, renewable energy storage, and technology manufacturing. This positions Ghana to:

• Become a key player in the green industrial supply chain. • Negotiate for technology transfer and skills development. • Integrate lithium extraction into a broader industrialization and energy transition plan.

The challenge is ensuring that the deal is not an isolated contract, but rather part of a coherent national strategy that leverages Ghana’s mineral wealth for industrial upgrading, job creation, and climate resilience.

Conclusion

The lithium mining lease between the Government of Ghana and Barari DV/Atlantic Lithium presents both a historic opportunity and a cautionary tale. While the deal is framed as a strategic milestone in Ghana’s green minerals agenda, the process and content reveal deep governance gaps that could undermine its potential benefits.

The absence of an open, competitive bidding process deprives Ghana of a verifiable basis to claim that the best possible terms were secured. This is compounded by the lack of transparency surrounding critical annexes such as the feasibility study, environmental mitigation commitments, and cost structures contrary to the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI, 2023). Allegations of concealed incentives, including a decade-long tax holiday and discounted electricity tariffs, raise red flags about whether the deal disproportionately favors the investor at the expense of public revenue and long-term development goals.

Beyond governance, the strategic orientation of the deal appears ambiguous. Ghana’s broader Minerals and Energy Transition Framework emphasizes value addition, technology transfer, and industrial linkages. Yet, the current lease terms suggest a “resource-for-now” approach focusing on extraction without binding commitments to domestic refining, battery manufacturing, or skills development. Such a path risks leaving the country with depleted reserves, environmental liabilities, and an unfulfilled promise of industrial transformation, as has occurred with other resource booms in sub-Saharan Africa.

Environmental and social safeguards, while acknowledged, hinge on the capacity of the EPA and Minerals Commission to enforce them. Historical trends suggest chronic under-resourcing and political interference in these agencies, making effective oversight uncertain. Without robust enforcement, environmental degradation, community displacement, and unmitigated social costs could overshadow the economic gains.

Ultimately, the Barari DV agreement will be a litmus test of Ghana’s ability to align resource governance with long-term national interest. The stakes extend beyond lithium; they touch on the credibility of parliamentary oversight, the integrity of extractive sector governance, and the country’s positioning in the global clean energy supply chain. As such, parliament’s role must transcend procedural ratification. A delay to allow for independent technical review, public consultation, and renegotiation of terms that guarantee transparent, value-adding, and environmentally sustainable extraction would not be a sign of weakness. It would be an assertion of sovereign stewardship over strategic resources.

Source notes — PDF page 8

8https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/07/can-critical-mineral-deals-benefit-local-communities-insights-from-ghanas-lithium-project?lang=en

Source notes — PDF page 9

9https://southernafricantimes.com/namibia-weighs-majority-local-ownership-requirement-in-future-mining-projects/ 10https://www.mining.com/web/zimbabwe-state-miner-says-lithium-assets-attractinvestors/ 11https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zimbabwe-aims-break-ground-270-million-new-lithium-plant-this-year-2025-07-16/

Source notes — PDF page 10

12https://iwatchafrica.org/2019/08/ghana-manganese-company-shut-down-following-iwatch-africas-investigation/ 13Assessing the Fiscal Regime in Ghana’s Lithium Agreement | Natural Resource Governance Institute 14Chile | New mining royalty is approved and ready to become law | EY - Global

Source notes — PDF page 11

15https://www.mining-technology.com/news/malis-mining-law-investment/ 16https://gna.org.gh/2025/03/lithium-exploration-communities-demand-bottom-up-compensation-negotiations/ 17https://www.mining-technology.com/news/atlantic-lithiums-ewoyaa/

Source notes — PDF page 12

18https://africachinareporting.com/can-ghanas-lithium-boom-avoid-the-gold-curse/

About this source

Transcribed from The Edfields Natural Resource Journal — September 2025, PDF pages 8–14. The original PDF retains the published layout, illustrations and references. Contributor roles are as printed in the publication.

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